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The Habsburg monarchy was conceived in 1527 as a borderland when the Ottoman
march into the Pannonian plain united the Austrian, Bohemian and Hungarian lands.
The latter’s vulnerability encouraged a consensual relationship between the Habs-
burg court and domestic elites that positioned Hungary’s political system between
“western” European absolutism and the anarchical “royal republicanism” of Po-
land. The Habsburg claim to the entire kingdom helped sustain the vision of a united
patrimony, ultimately realized following the triumph over the Ottomans and defini-
tively confirmed in 1867. The combination of Hungary’s borderline character and
competing jurisdictions contributed to political instability during the 16th and 17th
centuries. Only after the Habsburgs had pushed the Ottomans from the Hungarian
plain, did the frontier begin a more conventional evolution. In a move that was a
clear break with previous frontier arrangements, the Habsburgs and Ottomans
clearly separated their territorial jurisdiction by drawing and demarcating the
boundary that pacified the frontier regime more in keeping with general develop-
ments in Europe. Outer borders gradually assumed new functions. The permanent
sanitary cordon that the Hasburgs established in 1728 along its entire length re-
mained an unparalleled public health institution, effectively blocking the spread of
plague from the Ottoman Balkans. In addition, it served as a migration control insti-
tution, signaling the ongoing transition to a modern international frontier, which
would have been unimaginable without its mobility control function. This spacial
transformation encouraged the kingdom’s recovery and re-population, as well as its
transition from a “borderland” into the “heart of Europe”. The simultaneous coloni-
zation of Hungary from the west and southeast stimulated its economic and demo-
graphic recovery, while compounding its linguistic and ethnic diversity, particularly
in border areas, thereby contributing to its dissolution in the age of nationalism.
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One of the staples of Habsburg history is the Czech historian František Palacky’s
exclamation that “If the Habsburg monarchy hadn’t existed, it would have to be
created.” In fact, the monarchy was conceived in the late middle ages as a border-
land and evolved into one of the continent’s great powers by fulfilling that func-
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tion with Hungary serving as the leading edge of its expanding eastern frontier. By
the middle of the 18th century the dynasty’s Austrian and Hungarian crown lands
had transitioned from a “borderland” into the “heart of Europe” that now stretched
to the Urals with two new players in its constellation of great powers. Over that
time, the Habsburg Gesamtstaat transitioned not only in time but also institution-
ally between eastern and western Europe. My own scholarship has pointed to five
principal attributes that defined Austrian exceptionalism, two of which are partic-
ularly germane to the subject of this volume and the conference from which it
originated: the diplomacy of geopolitics and the reliance on consensus.1
First and foremost is the role that diplomacy played in a meteoric ascent that
was deeply influenced by geopolitical calculus. Until the middle of the 18th cen-
tury the monarchy’s central location was unique among the major continental
powers. Both Spain stood at the end of the European peninsula while England
readily evolved from hegemon to sole proprietor of the British Isles. France’s es-
sentially isthmian position greatly limited the number of potentially hostile neigh-
bors. Like Spain and Britain, both Russia and the Ottoman empire benefited from
privileged positions along the edges of the continent, along with massive stretches
of uninhabited wasteland along their peripheries. If the Habsburg monarchy’s
central location exposed it to multiple threats, it also made it a valuable ally for
other states against mutual adversaries. Indeed its greatest virtue rested in being
sufficiently strong to serve as an effective counterpoise without being so powerful
as to threaten the long-term security of its putative allies. Over the centuries,
Machiavelli’s dictum that neutral powers side with the weaker of any two bellig-
erent powers was a prescription for allying with the House of Habsburg.
Admittedly, the monarchy’s exposed central location brought with it the heavy
burden of defending multiple frontiers, sometimes simultaneously. While their
Ottoman adversary could typically pick and choose its preferred theater of opera-
tions and then act unilaterally, the monarchy was compelled to react to threats
from multiple points of the compass, practicing a strategic triage designed to parry
the blows of its enemies, rather than vanquish and occupy them. Historians have
long appreciated the East–West dilemma that successive emperors confronted in
the 16th and 17th centuries when choosing whether to repel threats in and around
Germany or in the Balkans. Less obvious were incipient threats that emerged in
the 18th century in Italy and Poland. A more comprehensive understanding of
Habsburg statecraft visualizes all four areas as vital buffers that had to be vigi-
lantly protected from salient military threats. Whenever any one of these four
glaces was breached, the Habsburgs worked to restore it by all available means.2
The first test came in Germany with the Reformation and in the Balkans following
the Ottoman conquest of most of Hungary; hence the ensuing succession of
Austro-Turkish wars that ended with the reconquest of the Hungarian plain. Just
as this task was being completed, the extinction of the Spanish Habsburgs obliged
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Emperors Leopold I (1657–1705), Joseph I (1705–11) and Charles VI (1711–40)
to wrest control of Italy from the Bourbons, a struggle that began with the War of
Spanish Succession (1701–14) and continued through 1748. By then, Frederick
II’s infamous rape of Silesia inspired Empress Maria Theresa (1740–80) to devote
her entire reign and four “Silesian wars” to restoring the dynasty’s previously he-
gemonic position in Germany. By then, Maria Theresa had resolved the Polish se-
curity crisis that had begun with the Great Déluge (1655–60), continued through
the diplomacy during the Great Northern War (1700–21) and ended with the cre-
ation the monarchy’s Galician glacis during the First Partition of the royal repub-
lic (1772).
If each Habsburg monarch employed different approaches in meeting these
and other security crises, their exposed position necessitated that they strive for
consensus in recruiting the largely voluntary support of the monarchy’s foreign
allies and domestic elites. This required remaining true to dynastically legitimate
goals that invariably respected the territorial integrity of weak neighbors in all
four regions. For good measure, successive emperors refrained from acting unilat-
erally prior to Emperor Francis Joseph’s preemptive actions in Italy (1859),
Bosnia (1878) and Serbia (1914). It also constrained the emperor to respect the
privileges and other interests of domestic stakeholders, both to ensure their sup-
port and to dissuade them from fomenting rebellion – perhaps in conjunction with
hostile foreign powers.
The necessity to compromise and forge consensus with them created a “transi-
tional” state and society with institutions and values that represented an amalgam
of East and West. Although successive emperors subscribed to the mantra of “one
king, one law, one god” that inspired their Spanish cousins, the French and Span-
ish Bourbons, and the British Stuarts, they reluctantly forewent the option of pro-
gressive governmental centralization that ultimately created culturally and lin-
guistically homogenous polities across Europe’s western face. Even after
Ferdinand II imposed the Verneuerte Landesordnung on the vanquished Bohe-
mian lands in 1627, their estates continued to negotiate and collect tax levies until
the middle of the 18th century – just as did their Austrian and Hungarian counter-
parts.3 Thus, the monarchy’s estates reflected a constitutional middle ground be-
tween the “western” European absolutism of Portugal, Spain and France and
“eastern” European models that ranged from the “Asiatic despotism” of tsars and
sultans to the anarchical “royal republicanism” of Poland which retained elective
kingship long after the institution had been discontinued in Bohemia (1627) and
Hungary (1687). Which is not to fault either the Habsburgs for their timidity or the
estates for their feudal obstinacy. As Fareed Zakaria has pointed out, the monar-
chy’s mix of feudal absolutism and constitutionalism represented a form of “lib-
eral authoritarianism” that protected human and civil rights better than most of the
newly forged democracies of post-Communist Europe.4
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Similarly, the Habsburgs were no more accepting of religious dissenters than
their counterparts in the West but were nonetheless obliged to tolerate both
Protestant and Orthodox Christians throughout most of their extensive Hungarian
lands, much as the Ottomans favored them over Catholics in their own Hungarian
lands. Certainly the survival of religious sects like Bohemia’s Utraquists and
Hungarian Unitarians were as much unlike western Europe as the large percent-
age of Jews in both kingdoms. Moreover, at a time when western Europeans were
gradually adopting a single received language, all three of the monarchy’s core
lands remained as linguistically diverse as the Ottoman Balkans, Polish Confeder-
ation and Russian empire – and becoming more so with the persistent immigration
of Orthodox Serbs and Romanians to Hungary. The monarchy’s confessional and
linguistic diversity was famously evident along the 1,900 km. long Military Bor-
der, where Serbs, Croats, Romanians, Szeklers, Vlachs and Germans shielded the
monarchy from Ottoman incursions. Indeed, the Habsburg military establishment
constituted another example of its transitional position within the European state
system. The regular army could hold its own in conventional operations against
France, Sweden and, eventually, Prussia in the West, but also featured the irregu-
lar formations and tactics of the celebrated Grenzer, Uzkok privateers, freelancing
heyducks, and paramilitaries raised by Hungarian estate owners that paralleled
Russian Cossacks and Turkish bashi-bazooks in the East. The same contrast ob-
tained between the monarchy’s stable western frontier and the erratic tempo and
tactics along a Military Border that acted more like a line of scrimmage with
“peacetime” raids bent on looting and kidnapping civilians for ransom; of course,
these hazards were also common to those living along the Ottomans’ Black Sea
littoral or opposite the shores of Africa’s Barbary Coast.
The monarchy’s economy was no less transitional. Its Austrian and Bohemian
lands sported significant industrial and commercial infrastructure and output to go
with a self-sustaining agricultural base; the subsequent acquisition of the Spanish
Netherlands and Lombardy added substantially to this bounty. Meanwhile, the
Ottoman invasions devastated the commercial economy of Hungary’s royal
towns and forced much of the peasantry to forsake agriculture for livestock rais-
ing.5 Those of Hungary’s peasants who continued to till the soil generally paid for
the privilege and protection of Hungary’s magnates by being reinserfed. Once
again, the “second serfdom” was a phenomenon that prevailed throughout the
East – including Bohemia and Germany’s East Elbian landscape – but was un-
known in the monarchy’s discontiguous western dominions or in the Austrian
lands, although the prevalence of compulsory labor service in the archduchies and
Inner Austria represented a middle ground between Europe’s free Western and
enserfed Eastern peasantry. If there was an exception to the East-West axis that
defined the monarchy’s structural orientation, it was in the world of culture. By
the late 16th century, the dynasty had wholeheartedly embraced a Counter-Refor-
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mation mentalité and representative Baroque forms that were more southern Eu-
ropean; aside from southern Germany this, too, distinguished the entire monarchy
not only from the Orthodox and Muslim East, but from Protestant northern Eu-
rope and even from the Baroque forms adopted in Catholic France. If we are to be-
lieve R.J.W. Evans, the mindset of the Habsburg Baroque was inherently irratio-
nal to the point of accepting the traditional forms in defiance of philosophical
trends that were just beginning to seize the imagination of French, British and
Protestant German high culture.6
***
To what extent did the Ottoman presence on its southern frontier affect this Tran-
sitional Empire? Certainly, it had a major impact, although its duration was finite
both in time and consequences. The Ottoman–Habsburg relationship can be di-
vided into three periods: (1) a confrontational phase (1526–1699) when the two
were committed enemies, with neither side willing to recognize the other’s legiti-
macy, (2) a transitional period (1700–68) when the Ottomans feared, respected
and recognized the emperor who, in turn, no longer deemed the Ottomans a threat
to the monarchy’s security and accepted them as a tolerable presence along the
borders of his empire at a time when Prussia and Russia had emerged as much
more formidable neighbors,7 and (3) a standing policy of preserving the Ottoman
empire (1769–1918) that began with its crushing defeats in the Russo–Turkish
War of 1768–74. Much of our focus here will be on the first period, during which
the Ottoman impact on the monarchy – and on Hungary in particular – has been
judged quite negative. Certainly this was the view of the emperors’ contemporar-
ies and subjects, many of whom lived in fear of Turkish raids and invasions,
against which all of the core lands bore the burdens of taxation and military ser-
vice.
Otherwise it is unclear how negatively Turkish threat impacted the monarchy
as a whole. Certainly the dynasty and monarchy itself drew strength throughout its
history from the succession of crises that built consensus, prompting badly needed
internal reform and eliciting sometimes massive assistance from neighboring
countries. After all, the Turks’ first appearance on the Hungarian plain provided
the most convincing raison d’être for the monarchy’s existence that led to prodi-
gious growth through the acquisition of Bohemia and Hungary. It also buttressed
its successful pretensions to leadership of the often fractious German nation. Per-
haps most important of all, the Turkish challenge greatly enhanced the unity of the
core lands, with Hungary relying heavily on Austrian and, especially, Bohemian
financial and human resources, while the German Erblande greatly appreciated
Hungary’s survival and continued role as a buffer between them and the dreaded
Turks. But there were limits to the bounty of the Türkengefahr. Whereas the great-
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est benefits invariably accrued from existential crises that threatened the monar-
chy’s very existence, the Habsburgs themselves never viewed the Ottoman men-
ace as a death threat. Admittedly the Turks themselves bore some responsibility
for this. With the minor exception of Sultan Suleiman’s Hungarian campaigns of
1554–56, they never attacked the monarchy when it was fully engaged elsewhere.
Even if such a Dolchstoss fell short of a fatal blow, it would have at least forced
the emperor to conclude an unfavorable peace with his Christian adversaries. Yet,
the sultan remained steadfastly neutral throughout the Thirty Years’ War, during
the four wars of succession that consumed the monarchy’s attention for much of
the 18th century, and in its subsequent struggle with revolutionary France. On two
occasions during the Thirty Years’ War and the Great Déluge he even frustrated
Swedish operations against the monarchy’s forces by recalling its Transylvanian
surrogates from Hungary.8
Remarkably enough, the Habsburg–Ottoman wars did not by themselves sig-
nificantly change either empire’s overall political, economic, or cultural structure
for the simple reason that the monarchy never felt sufficiently threatened. Al-
though the Ottomans twice besieged Vienna, they never shook the confidence of
the policy makers in Vienna, who felt that any losses would be but temporary,
both because of their access to support from allies and because of the logistical
problems that constrained the sultan’s forces. If anything, the Turkish threat
obliged successive emperors to retain the existing governmental and socio-eco-
nomic system, albeit one that evolved within the cultural framework of Coun-
ter-Reformation. Right up until 1683, they gave precedence to meeting threats in
the West, both because land there was seen as more valuable while territory lost in
the East could be more easily recovered. The triumphant Holy League (1684–99)
vindicated this calculus, further entrenching the monarchy’s triarchical power
structure, which celebrated its apotheosis with the self-congratulatory flourishes
of the High Baroque right up until 1740.9 Rather, systemic change came only with
the sudden loss of Silesia and the realization that the Prussian threat was truly ex-
istential.
Which is not to say that the Ottoman challenge did not elicit some additional
benefits. Among the best-known was the Military Border which facilitated the
restoration of agriculture, programmatic resettlement, and a general state of nor-
malcy to the rest of the Hungarian plain, Transylvania and Croatia.10 Meanwhile,
its Grenzer formations eventually grew to roughly a quarter of the Habsburg mili-
tary and were eventually employed elsewhere in Europe at a fraction of the cost of
regular army units.11 The Habsburg-Ottoman frontier itself also contributed to the
evolution of modern international borders.
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Linear Boundaries
Sixteenth- and 17th-century Hungary was, in fact, a giant Habsburg–Ottoman bor-
derland. The frontier was heavily militarized, dotted with fortresses and smaller
fortifications. On the Habsburg side, border areas were organized into the Military
Border, stretching from Adriatic Sea to the Carpathian mountains in what is today
Slovakia. A similar organization existed in Ottoman frontier provinces. The prov-
inces deeper inside both empires participated as well, sending soldiers and subsi-
dies to the frontier. Even in official peacetime, there persisted a low intensity
Kleinkrieg that featured intermittent raids, robberies, and kidnappings for ransom.
Moreover, jurisdictions overlapped, with Hungarian nobles claiming feudal rights
over certain communities on the Ottoman side of the border. The peasants in areas
where jurisdictions overlapped were taxed twice.12 Intermittent peacetime vio-
lence, insecurity, and competing jurisdictions were unusual in other parts of Eu-
rope. However, in many other aspects, the Habsburg–Ottoman border was not
atypical during this period. For example, France’s border with the Spanish Neth-
erlands was also heavily fortified.13 Central governments across the continent
were organizing frontiers as defensive zones and had little interest in precisely de-
fining their boundaries. Instead, the concept of sovereignty was based on the per-
sonal patrimonial bond between the ruler and his subjects. All rights and jurisdic-
tions, such as the rulers’ responsibility to defend their subjects, derived from this
relationship. In this arrangement, precise territorial limits were not important and
were considered a matter of purely local significance.14
That changed at the end of the 17th century, when the Habsburg–Ottoman fron-
tier was profoundly transformed by the peace congress of Carlowitz (1698–99).
During the negotiations the Ottoman representatives proposed to organize the
new border as a demarcated linear boundary. They were not unfamiliar with such
a solution, having previously regulated their boundaries with Venice, Po-
land–Lithuania and other neighboring countries.15 The Carlowitz settlement in-
troduced other changes, including the border’s total pacification from the moment
that peace was concluded. Not only were robberies, abductions, and attacks of any
sort strictly forbidden, but perpetrators were to be severely punished. A joint bor-
der commission traveled the course of the new frontier 1699–1701 determining
the precise borderline by placing markers, such as piles of earth and wooden
poles, then carefully describing them in delimitation protocols. The Habsburg
side also created a series of maps representing the new border.16 Both parties rec-
ognized each other’s territorial sovereignty by clearly separating their jurisdic-
tions over space and subjects. They even reduced the number of the existing bor-
der fortifications and prohibited the construction of new ones. Henceforth, their
subjects were to be allowed to live in peace and security, despite their proximity to
the border.
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With the peace of Carlowitz, central governments assumed greater responsibil-
ity for their international borders. Rather than employing the traditional invento-
ries of jurisdictions and rights that were standard in other parts of Europe, they in-
troduced technical and abstract knowledge in the form of maps and demarcation
protocols. With the information collected, the Habsburg central government
could ideally redraw the borderline without local help and experience. In many
cases, the central government actually disregarded or ignored local interests. In
1703, the Habsburg military expelled its subjects from their homes near the
Bosnian town Novi, resolving the last territorial dispute with the Ottomans. At the
later treaty of Sistova (1791) the Ottomans ceded a narrow strip of land in western
Bosnia to the Habsburgs without consulting the locals, who were then instructed
to sell their property on the “wrong” side of the new border.17 The new role of cen-
tral authorities marks a gradual transition from personal patrimonial to a visually
defined territorial concept of jurisdiction.18 It is visible in changing attitudes to-
ward cross-border mobility. The Carlowitz Peace Treaty of 1699 allowed the joint
use of the Maros (Mureó), Tisza and Sava Rivers, including the islands along
them, with local residents freely crossing the line. During the Rákóczi Rebellion
(1703–11), the Habsburg commanders carried correspondence through the Otto-
man territory. The Ottoman governors complained only when armed Habsburg
militiamen fleeing Hungarian rebels entered the Ottoman Banat without first
seeking permission. In 1739, a stricter concept of territorial sovereignty was intro-
duced. Physical space and the borderline in particular became an important part of
state’s identity. The smallest border infringements were therefore viewed not as
local incidents, but as challenges to state sovereignty. From that moment on, not
even fishermen were allowed to cross the line, which divided the river frontiers in
two. The Habsburg court complained when local Ottoman subjects did not adhere
to this provision.19 Similar processes in southern, western and central Europe be-
gan several decades later.20 Yet by then the Habsburg border with the Ottomans
had gone one step further with the introduction of a permanent mobility control
regime in the form of sanitary cordon.
Sanitary Cordon
The most fearsome epidemic of that time, the plague, was endemic in many parts
of the Ottoman Empire. By the 14th century, Europeans had begun to realize that
the only effective measure was the isolation of infected areas and of people com-
ing from there. If a sequestered individual did not show signs of disease for a cer-
tain period of time (typically 40 days), s/he was considered healthy and allowed to
continue traveling. From the 15th century onwards, most European ports estab-
lished quarantine facilities and began sequestering all ships coming from the East-
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ern Mediterranean. Epidemics spreading by land were harder to contain. Whole
provinces had to be isolated by a protective cordon, across which all communica-
tion was strictly supervised, usually by the military, allowing only persons who
underwent quarantine to pass. Such measures were introduced during the last epi-
demic of plague in western Europe, when France and neighboring countries suc-
cessfully contained the epidemics that broke out in Marseille in 1720–22 within
the county of Provence.21 Yet such protective cordons were temporary and were
disbanded as soon as the danger passed.
When a plague epidemic swept through Hungary in the final phase of the
Rákóczi Rebellion (1703–11), Emperor Joseph I ordered the formation of the
temporary land sanitary cordon (Pestfront, Kordon) between Hungary and Inner
Austria (1710). All travel and trade was redirected through heavily guarded quar-
antine stations that effectively prevented unauthorized contact.22 Once the danger
had passed the central government abolished the cordon much as other European
states had. Yet the monarchy’s long and relatively porous land border with the Ot-
toman Empire placed it in a far more exposed position that demanded more than
temporary measures. After all, plague epidemics regularly infested the Ottoman
frontier provinces, placing Habsburg Hungary and, ultimately, the Erblande in
permanent danger. In 1728, Emperor Charles VI established a permanent sanitary
cordon along the entire Ottoman frontier.23 Although this first effort collapsed
during the Habsburg-Ottoman war of 1737–39, a second, more definitive Pest-
front was erected following the Peace of Belgrade (1739) that lasted until 1857.24
The sanitary cordon was a formidable institution, stretching roughly 1,900 km
from the Adriatic Sea to Poland. For the most part, it followed natural lines and
barriers such as the Una, Sava, and Danube Rivers and the Carpathian Mountains.
It was closely monitored from watchtowers and through regular patrols to prevent
unauthorized crossings. Illegal immigrants and their accomplices were tried be-
fore criminal or martial courts without the right of appeal and subject to severe
punishment.25 By the 1760s, when the Military Border expanded eastward into the
Banat of Temesvár and Transylvania, replacing less effective service by local
peasants, the entire sanitary cordon was congruent with outer boundaries of the
Military Border. By 1776, the military administration had proven so effective that
the sanitary personnel were placed under the direct authority of the War Coun-
cil.26 In 1770, the border could be crossed through nineteen quarantine stations,
approximately one every 100 km. Here, the incoming travelers were identified,
registered both locally and in the central records in Vienna, and provided with per-
sonal identification documents, passports and sanitary certificates (Sanitäts-
Foede). The quarantine time usually ranged from 21 to 42 days.27 Initially border
control and supervision had two official purposes: protecting public health while
preserving uninterrupted trade with the Ottoman Empire. By 1752, however, the
central government officially acknowledged other functions, such as the preven-
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tion of banditry, espionage, contraband, desertion, and unwanted peasant emigra-
tion, as well as the safe bilateral use of border resources that included pulling
barges upstream on whichever side of the river was more convenient.28 Mean-
while, the cordon consistently vindicated its initial raison d’être by blocking the
spread of several outbreaks of plague.29
In addition to being one of few linear boundaries in Europe, the Habsburg–Ot-
toman border was very advanced as a migration control institution for its time. It is
difficult to find comparable systematic and comprehensive countrywide mobility
control regimes in other parts of Europe. Similar regimes were eventually intro-
duced in most European states after the French Revolution and especially after
1918.30 In this respect, the Habsburg–Ottoman frontier signaled the evolution of
the modern international frontier, which would be unimaginable today without its
mobility control function. Specific needs and circumstances gradually produced
quite a novel arrangement in the southern areas of Hungary, an important contri-
bution to the development of the state and governance in modern times.
***
Whereas Hungary shared in the benefits of the Grenzer formations and sanitary
cordon that protected it as well as the rest of the monarchy, the Ottoman impact on
the kingdom was nothing short of catastrophic. The Malthusian demographic con-
sequences have attracted scholarly research for generations. The initial Ottoman
marches up the Danube valley in 1529 and 1541 reduced the levels of habitation
by 70–90% through mass flight to Upper Hungary. As a result of this shift, popu-
lation densities in the Hungarian plain fell to roughly half of the northern and
western counties that formed the rump of Habsburg Royal Hungary. Thereafter,
campaigning armies of both sides grievously afflicted the civilian populations
across the kingdom, particularly during Long War (1591–1606). Although the lat-
est data records marginal increases in population under Turkish rule, this was
likely due to steady immigration of Serbs, Romanians and others who were drawn
from the Ottoman Balkans with incentives from Hungarian estate holders who
were eager to repopulate their depleted estates.31 The Habsburg reconquest was
attended by the forced emigration of Turkish and other Muslim settlers, including
100,000 from the Banat at the end of the Austro–Turkish War of 1716–18. Two
decades later, most of the colonists who had settled there were wiped out by war-
time flight and disease. A sustained colonization program under Maria Theresa
and Joseph II successfully repopulated the Hungarian plain and Transylvania well
beyond pre-Ottoman levels. Nonetheless, the massive influx of Reich Germans
and Habsburg subjects from the north and west, together with the concurrent im-
migration of Ottoman Serbs and Romanians from the south greatly reduced the
Magyars themselves to a minority in their own country. The resulting linguistic
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and confessional diversity of greater Hungary presaged the 19th-century nationali-
ties conflicts and the kingdom’s partition at Trianon [Treaty of Trianon, 1920].
Ottoman Hungary’s demographic upheaval was attended by unfortunate
socio-economic developments. The aforementioned commercial losses sustained
by the royal towns reduced the size and strength of the bourgeoisie, even as the
ranks of the nobility swelled through the ennoblement of fighters against the
Turks and the wealth of reconverted Catholic magnates appreciated with royal pa-
tronage and the wholesale adoption of estate capitalism.32 Nor was the subsequent
reconquest an unmitigated blessing. At no point during the Ottoman occupation
had the government in Vienna psychologically accepted Royal Hungary as an
equal constituent in the Habsburg Gesamtstaat. At a time when the Bohemia was
earning equal billing with the Austrian crown lands as conjoint parts of the Ger-
man “hereditary lands” or Erblande, Hungary never earned this appellation even
after the Sopron Diet (1687) had adopted the Habsburg male line’s right to heredi-
tary succession. Hungarians were almost never admitted to the emperor’s most
powerful decision-making councils, which remained the exclusive domain of
Austrian and German-speaking Bohemian nobles, plus a smattering of Italians
and Reich Germans. As late as 1740 the kingdom existed as a discrete territorial
appendage to be taxed, colonized and employed as a glacis against Ottoman
empire.
Although the policy of extralegal taxation ended with Leopold I, his successors
circumscribed the Hungarian and Croatian diets’ jurisdiction over the Military
Border, Banat, and Transylvania by entrusting their administration – including
colonization efforts – to the Hofkriegsrat and Hofkammer. Nobody could have an-
ticipated the role that the Habsburg kings’ “southern strategy” would have in abet-
ting the autonomist pretensions of the kingdom’s non-Magyar populations. None-
theless, the resettlement and administrative restructuring of the kingdom’s neo
acquistica conceived and incubated a diversity that would contribute to the king-
dom’s dissolution in 1918.
Much as the Ottoman invasion doomed Hungary to two centuries of political,
demographic, and economic decline, it was the Prussian descent on Silesia in
1740 that shocked Vienna into adopting dramatic structural changes that greatly
benefited the monarchy – including Hungary. This is not the place to recount the
recovery that began under Maria Theresa. But it is appropriate to identify the ad-
mittedly few advantages that the kingdom derived from its difficult two-cen-
tury-long division as a Habsburg–Ottoman borderland. If nothing else, the endur-
ing Habsburg claim to the entire kingdom helped sustain the vision of a united pat-
rimony that would not have been a priority for other invaders who would have
readily dismembered it. The separately administered entities were themselves re-
stored incrementally by Maria Theresa (Banat), Joseph II (Transylvania), and
Francis Joseph (Vojvodina, Military Border). Although the kingdom’s constitu-
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tion was ignored or abrogated altogether on several occasions, it was periodically
reaffirmed, most notably at Sopron (1687), Szatmár (1711) and definitively by the
Dual Compromise of 1867, while the Austrian and Bohemian lands remained sub-
merged in the conglomerate of crown lands collectively known as Cisleithania.
Indeed, unlike all of the other Habsburg dominions – Austria and Bohemia, as
well as the Austrian Netherlands, Lombardy, Galicia and Bosnia – Hungary is the
only component of its patrimony that has continuously maintained the status of an
independent state, albeit in the truncated form rendered at Trianon.
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